_Regulatory Comments

From: Gerald Hutto <no-reply@cuanswers.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2015 3:08 PM
To: _Regulatory Comments
Subject: Risk-Based Capital Comment

To: Regulatory Comments
From: Gerald Hutto
Team One Credit Union

03/17/2015

Dear Mr. Poliquin:

Our credit union's board of directors believes this rule is overreaching as many of the failures this proposed rule is trying to mitigate do not even take into consideration the reasons for the losses during the great recession. As has been depicted during the board meeting and in the proposal, over 40% of failures were the result of fraud; all of us have been following the St. Paul Croatian's fraud loss dilemma, which cost the insurance fund $170 million dollars to date. Economic policy had nothing to do with many of these losses, regardless of the shape of credit unions' balance sheets. The idea that passing a rule—a seemingly typical government reaction—can stop fraud, eliminate mismanagement and prevent external circumstances from decimating credit union's market environment is wrong. Effective supervision is not rule making, it is intelligent supervision and patient reorganization when problems arise. This is lacking in our cu regulatory community today.

I believe the revised RBC rule penalizes credit unions for specific activities such as real estate lending, member business lending, and credit unions chartered to assist the un-bankable by placing a capital tax on the resulting assets of low income or poor credit lending. We believe the end result will be thousands of homogenous balance sheets in 2025 that you can easily understand from a supervisory perspective. However, this current risk posture of the NCUA cannot fail but to lead credit unions to shy away from diversity or cooperative reason for the charter and field of membership. The end result of this rule will ultimately force credit unions into potential areas of investment and lending that the credit union lacks experience with or create industry wide concentrations that could be impacted by similar economic variables. In and of itself, this rule creates more risk than it proposes to control.

Our credit union leadership team feels that while there is no question the NCUA did make changes in the RBC rule with respect to such items as the definition of "complex" credit unions, eliminating IRR, and extending the implementation timeframe, the impact to the industry if RBC2 is passed remains highly suspect and likely detrimental. Although the proposal was 450 pages, far too many were reviews of the comments and the NCUA's rebuttal or disregard of them. In a vacuum, the changes accepted by the NCUA would appear good but in fact are designed to draw credit union leadership away from impact of the rule as a whole. We believe that the RBC rule will increase costs to members, expand the right of the NCUA to interfere in the governance of credit unions through Prompt Corrective Action ("PCA"), and threaten the financial stability of the industry long term.

The NCUA and the credit union industry would both be served better if the formulas and risk weights within RBC were not given the force of law. Do not force my credit union to institute changes both potentially drastic and unwarranted in our balance sheet to meet these arbitrary weights.

Congress intended for the NCUA to develop rules around credit union complexity that would take into account the diversity of credit unions. An arbitrary asset cut-off point is contrary to the mission Congress provided to the NCUA, which is to take in account the special nature of my members' relationship with my credit union.

As pointed out in the Hon. J. Mark McWatters' dissent, the NCUA has pivoted away from its own long-standing interpretation of Section 216(d) of the Federal Credit Union Act. In 2007, the NCUA asked Congress to amend the regulation because you said the NCUA needed additional authority to create a two-tiered Risk Based Capital test. Can you explain why you suddenly believe the NCUA has the authority to do so, when your past practice has been the exact opposite?

As mentioned by the Hon J. Mark McWatters, the NCUA cannot just "piggyback" on to the FDIC unless they have the authority from Congress to do so. The plain language of the statute contradicts the NCUA's interpretation. After all, if the NCUA was to be given the same PCA authority as the FDIC, Congress could have done exactly that. The clear intent of Congress was to create a separate system for our industry, and the NCUA must operate within those confines.

The NCUA should reconsider implementing a two-tiered RBNW that is at odds with the agency's past interpretation of its powers, and which conflicts with the plain language and intent of Congress. Not only has an NCUA Board Member strongly dissented from the NCUA's proposed Rule, but the legal foundation the NCUA is relying upon is weak. Much of the weaknesses in the NCUA's arguments can be found directly in the memo prepared by the Paul Hastings, LLP, law firm, for the NCUA Board.

The NCUA is straining hard to justify its legal interpretation of a Rule that has significant practical problems. The $100,000 asset size cut off is arbitrary. The risk weighting is arbitrary. Adherence to this rule could cause credit unions to build up concentrations in assets that turn out to be risky. Why doesn't the NCUA allow for a rule that allows for supplemental capital, which would likely be far greater benefit to the industry and greatly reduce the risk to the Share Insurance Fund? Finally, why should the industry accept RBC when it suffers from these problems and may very well be an overextension of the NCUA's authority in any event?

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