

From: [Keegan Daniel](#)
To: [Regulatory Comments](#)
Subject: Risk-Based Capital Comment
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From: Keegan Daniel
CU* Answers

02/04/2015

Dear Mr. Poliquin:

History has shown that the cooperative model of credit unions is a successful one. The diverse nature of our charters has meant that despite little capital—except member good will and loyalty—the forefathers and current stakeholders of the industry have built the second largest financial system in America today, serving close to 40 million households with savings of nearly \$1 trillion. The proposed rule will serve to hinder that diversity by placing credit unions into more general categories. Protect the true nature of credit unions by ending this rule so we can celebrate the charters that made this industry possible, from the \$60 billion Navy FCU to any of the \$1-5 million “family” credit unions. From the farming communities of South Dakota serving family farms with loans to the taxi drivers from NYC to San Francisco. From the raw recruit in San Diego to the forward deployed military professional in Diego Garcia, Korea, or Afghanistan. From the auto worker in Detroit or Tennessee to the high tech communities of Silicon Valley.

Our credit union’s board of directors believes this rule is overreaching as many of the failures this proposed rule is trying to mitigate do not even take into consideration the reasons for the losses during the great recession. As has been depicted during the board meeting and in the proposal, over 40% of failures were the result of fraud; all of us have been following the St. Paul Croatian’s fraud loss dilemma, which cost the insurance fund \$170 million dollars to date. Economic policy had nothing to do with many of these losses, regardless of the shape of credit unions’ balance sheets. The idea that passing a rule—a seemingly typical government reaction—can stop fraud, eliminate mismanagement and prevent external circumstances from decimating credit union's market environment is wrong. Effective supervision is not rule making, it is intelligent supervision and patient reorganization when problems arise. This is lacking in our cu regulatory community today.

I believe the revised RBC rule penalizes credit unions for specific activities such as real estate lending, member business lending, and credit unions chartered to assist the un-bankable by placing a capital tax on the resulting assets of low income or poor credit lending. We believe the end result will be thousands of homogenous balance sheets in 2025 that you can easily understand from a supervisory perspective. However, this current risk posture of the NCUA cannot fail but to lead credit unions to shy away from diversity or cooperative reason for the charter and field of membership. The end result of this rule will ultimately force credit unions into potential areas of investment and lending that the credit union lacks experience with or create industry wide concentrations that could be impacted by similar economic variables. In and of itself, this rule creates more risk than it proposes to control.

Our credit union leadership team feels that while there is no question the NCUA did make changes in the RBC rule with respect to such items as the definition of "complex" credit unions, eliminating IRR, and extending the implementation timeframe, the impact to the industry if RBC2 is passed remains highly suspect and likely detrimental. Although the proposal was 450 pages, far too many were reviews of the comments and the NCUA's rebuttal or disregard of them. In a vacuum, the changes accepted by the NCUA would appear good but in fact are designed to draw credit union leadership away from impact of the rule as a whole. We believe that the RBC rule will increase costs to members, expand the right of the NCUA to interfere in the governance of credit unions through Prompt Corrective Action ("PCA"), and threaten the financial stability of the industry long term.

The NCUA and the credit union industry would both be served better if the formulas and risk weights within RBC were not given the force of law. Do not force my credit union to institute changes both potentially drastic and unwarranted in our balance sheet to meet these arbitrary weights.

Congress intended for the NCUA to develop rules around credit union complexity that would take into account the diversity of credit unions. An arbitrary asset cut-off point is contrary to the mission Congress provided to the NCUA, which is to take in account the special nature of my members' relationship with my credit union.

As pointed out in the Hon. J. Mark McWatters' dissent, the NCUA has pivoted away from its own long-standing interpretation of Section 216(d) of the Federal Credit Union Act. In 2007, the NCUA asked Congress to amend the regulation because you said the NCUA needed additional authority to create a two-tiered Risk Based Capital test. Can you explain why you suddenly believe the NCUA has the authority to do so, when your past practice has been the exact opposite?

As mentioned by the Hon J. Mark McWatters, the NCUA cannot just "piggyback" on to the FDIC unless they have the authority from Congress to do so. The plain language of the statute contradicts the NCUA's interpretation. After all, if the NCUA was to be given the same PCA authority as the FDIC, Congress could have done exactly that. The clear intent of Congress was to create a separate system for our industry, and the NCUA must operate within those confines.

The NCUA should reconsider implementing a two-tiered RBNW that is at odds with the agency's past interpretation of its powers, and which conflicts with the plain language and intent of Congress. Not only has an NCUA Board Member strongly dissented from the NCUA's proposed Rule, but the legal foundation the NCUA is relying upon is weak. Much of the weaknesses in the NCUA's arguments can be found directly in the memo prepared by the Paul Hastings, LLP, law firm, for the NCUA Board.

The NCUA is straining hard to justify its legal interpretation of a Rule that has significant practical problems. The \$100,000 asset size cut off is arbitrary. The risk weighting is arbitrary. Adherence to this rule could cause credit unions to build up concentrations in assets that turn out to be risky. Why doesn't the NCUA allow for a rule that allows for supplemental capital, which would likely be far greater benefit to the industry and greatly reduce the risk to the Share Insurance Fund? Finally, why should the industry accept RBC when it suffers from these problems and may very well be an overextension of the NCUA's authority in any event?

Our credit union believes the RBC2 rule would undermine the cooperative and diverse nature of our charters by creating a one size fits all over-reaching capital formula. This is a massive flaw of the NCUA's structure as regulator and insurer. We believe this is a myopic view of cooperatives and only considers our equity funding mechanism. A cooperative is a like group of individuals bannng together to own a business that is guaranteed to meet their similar financial needs. The arguments and logic of the rule misapplies what is done successfully at a local or institutional level, to an entire system. Because of this I would respectfully recommend the rule be thrown out and at best become a matrix the NCUA would use in the exam process only.

Our credit union board and management team are making numerous decisions about the composition of our balance sheet and capital adequacy based on the needs of our unique membership and local community. These factors do not just take into consideration the asset type, but include the reasons for our charter to begin with, corresponding funding from liabilities, and unique economic needs of the communities they serve. These thousands of local decisions are driven by diverse business priorities, pricing and growth objectives as well as responses to unique local needs. We believe our decisions have resulted in varied portfolio strategies which enhance the balance sheet's overall soundness rather than a single approach nationwide to risk management. RBC2 puts that at risk.

Although Congress has stated NCUA must develop risk based capital standards and they must be formulated in a similar fashion as the banking industry, we do not believe Congress wished to create a tax on members and abandon the cooperative principals of credit unions. Since the publication in the Federal Register the actual costs associated with this capital tax have been challenged. Recently NAFCU published an estimate that credit unions will need to raise an additional \$760 million dollars in capital to achieve their current capital levels. Because credit unions only have one source of earnings, that additional capital tax must come directly out of our members' pockets through a reduction in savings rates, increase in loan rates, and potentially changes to transaction fees. We believe NCUA's estimate falls far short of the actual cost to the industry and again focused on the potential risk to the insurance fund rather than those they regulate and ultimately their members . In an effort to remain the best financial resource for our members, we would encourage the NCUA to withdraw the proposed rule altogether.

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When CUs are engaged in a daily, hand-to-hand struggle to help folks improve their lives, to encourage their hopes, to educate their kids, and to find a way to stretch shrinking paychecks to the end of the month: then yes, I get angry and incensed by silly people, sheltered from accountability and the hard realities of this desperate economic struggle who recklessly and insensibly make our tasks unnecessarily more

difficult. RBC needs to go.

For those of us who remember when the airline industry went into crisis with mergers and failures, their credit unions survived to serve their members; when the auto industry closed plants and had layoffs, their credit unions converted to communities to be there for the workers and families; when the housing crisis hit in California, Florida, and Arizona, credit unions rewrote billions of mortgage loans to keep people in their homes until they got back on their feet. The rule undermines the core of credit union effectiveness by having government rules, not the member-owner's well-being, be the focus of business strategy.

I would like to recommend that the NCUA truly believes that this rule will uncover the outliers and those credit unions that should operate with higher levels of capital than make this rule a test similar to those currently being performed like the 17/4. The OCC has numerous ratios and tests which they perform based upon call report information such as the canary ratios. These ratios are designed to uncover outliers and direct supervision in these areas to review.

We must stop the debate about the nuances of the rule and convince the NCUA, after outlining the substantial objections, that the modeling approach needs to be tested and tried in the examination process as a tool and then the results shared with the industry before suggesting that a model be embedded in a law.



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